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When completed from attachment, Tab A
Berlin Contingency Planning - Tripartite Meeting June 5

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To: 3 - Mr. Murphy

Through: E/S

From: EHR - Fay D. Kohler

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning - Tripartite Meeting June 5

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AUG 14 1975

You may wish to raise the following matters during your discussion of Berlin contingency planning with Ambassadors Ganssle and Alphonse June 5. The British have indicated that they may distribute a paper relating to possible economic countermeasures and that they may also have Foreign Office reactions on a draft statement (see 4 below) and on our counter-measures paper.

1. Nonmilitary Measures

1. Counter-harassments

The President has indicated his desire that the question of counter-harassments should be studied by a tripartite group at a rather low staff level. This working group would examine the problem and submit recommendations to the respective governments but would not seek to formulate official positions.

As the problems of counter-harassment and other nonmilitary countermeasures are closely interrelated and in fact tend to merge at some points, this working group could probably be responsible for examining all nonmilitary measures, including counter-harassments. As necessary, particular countermeasures could be examined by special working groups such as that which studied the possibility of referring the Berlin question to the United Nations. You might note here that the apparent lack of progress at Geneva makes it still more advisable that all contingency planning be moved along.

Although Embassy Bonn has recommended that the Germans be invited to participate in counter-harassment planning, it was agreed that the Germans should not be brought into discussions for the present. However, they should be brought in before the matter is presented in the wider NATO forum.

If the British and French accept this proposal, we would designate Mr. _____ as our representative on the working group.

2. Diplomatic

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2. Diplomatic Measures

We have had our missions approach non-NATO governments about the situation in Berlin and Germany. We have been more concerned with presenting and understanding of the issues involved than in soliciting support for the specific aspects of our plan. Consequently, we have stressed (1) that the crisis was provoked by the Soviet Union and that it carries with it the danger of global war; (2) the significance for all non-Communists if the Western nations should fail to preserve the freedom of the West Berliners; (3) our opposition to the artificial division of Germany and our belief that such division carries a threat to the peace, and (4) our preparedness to negotiate seriously.

Reactions from most posts indicate relative indifference to the specifics of the Geneva negotiations but widespread sentiment for peaceful settlement. In some cases this latter feeling extends to opposition toward any unilateral action to alter the existing situation, particularly if such action should involve use of force. There may be some possibility for utilizing this sentiment to persuade some of the key neutrals to make representations along these lines to the Four Powers. However, the key neutrals are generally non-committal at this time.

We intend to explore this possibility further with Ambassador Barber in Washington next week and we would also welcome the thoughts of the British and French on possible fruitful approaches to key neutral countries.

3. Referral of the Berlin Question to the UN

The Department has prepared a study on "Possible Reference of the Berlin Question to the UN," which examines the possibilities of seizing the UN of the Berlin problem under various hypothetical circumstances in the absence of agreement among the Four Powers. (The Department of Defense has concurred with this paper.) Copies were given to the British and French Embassies on May 29.

The first possibility envisaged for UN action would be at the point negotiations with the USSR break down but prior to a USSR transfer of its responsibilities to the East Germans or other unilateral moves affecting the status of Berlin. This is considered the most favorable circumstance in which the Western Powers could take the initiative in the Security Council, since we could then request a UN endorsement of the status quo. The British and French agree with this section of the paper.

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The remainder of the story, which deals with the situation which would prevail after unilateral Soviet action on Berlin, appears certain to be approved by the UK. While the French have indicated some reservations about this section of the paper (paragraphs 12 - 27) particularly with regard to the forest, it is being referred to the Quai d'Orsay, and the United States hopes agreement will be forthcoming.

II Military Measures

4. The draft public statement (to be made by the US, UK and France) if and when the Soviet Union announces the imminent turning over to the "GDR" of the checkpoints for Allied access to Berlin has been agreed. It is now being revised. The changes are non-substantive to improve its accuracy and take into account recent developments. A preamble is being added stressing the protective role of our presence in Berlin and minimizing the purely occupational theme.

5. Probes to Test Soviet Intentions (LIVE GDR)

Defense has indicated the intention to table a paper Friday setting forth U.S. views on the three types of probes deemed feasible on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn. Unless received by then, the paper will not reflect General Berstad's own views on the use of non-NAVO communications as recommended by Defense and concurred in by the Department (Defense paper - Tab A).

Course of Action "A" provides for: Tacit acceptance of any obstructions imposed by the Soviet/GDR forces. This is not considered useful either by Defense or State since it does not tell us any more about Soviet/GDR intentions than we already know and does not provide conclusive evidence of their determination to use force or permit the use of force.

Course of Action "B" provides for: Acceptance of any obstructions imposed by the Soviet/GDR forces only after they have shown determination to support their actions by force.

Course of Action "C" provides for: Positive action to breach any obstructions without the use of fire, except in self-defense.

The latter two courses are both regarded by Defense as militarily acceptable.

Defense has informed General Berstad of ^{JCS} ~~US~~ agreement to certain of his proposals. (Tab "A" paragraphs 2a and 2b)

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State is requested to

- (a) Inform the United Kingdom and France of the views contained in 2a and 2b above.
- (b) Urge the United Kingdom and France to furnish their approval or comments to General Norstad without delay.
- (c) Reach clear agreement that General Norstad shall serve as the commander of the Tripartite Operations.

It has been suggested that you may wish to inform the President of this matter at some point.

6. Air Contingency Planning

The three Ambassadors at Bonn have referred to Washington for decision by your committee a tripartitely agreed working level paper setting forth the alternatives open to the Western Powers in the event of Soviet withdrawal from BASC. It was felt that the problem requires political decisions unrelated to aviation. (Bonn paper - Tab "B") Alternative 1, after pointing out the increased difficulties, provides for maintenance of a reduced measure of safety control by Air Traffic Control for aircraft in the corridors through augmented Allied radar and radio facilities. No East German personnel would be permitted in BASC. This would be accompanied by the statement proposed in the April 4 Contingency Planning Paper that the Allies "expect their traffic to move freely to and from Berlin and will assume the Soviets have given blanket assurance of safety of all Three Power aircraft in the Berlin corridors and Berlin control zone." However, Allied commercial airlines are more likely to agree to continue flying if some means of advance notification of allied corridor flights to the West Zone air traffic control authorities can be found; West Germany has declared that it would also prefer that some system of notification continue in force. Presumably the French Air Force and USAF would feel the same but this consideration is not decisive in the case of military aircraft.

Alternative two would also exclude East Germans from BASC but would attempt to notify East German authorities in advance of Western flights so they can effectively provide flight separation.

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This would be accomplished either by use of the existing telephone line from HAMB to Tegelshorst or by existing teletype and phone facilities between Tempelhof and the East German Lufthansa ticket office in East Berlin. The latter is operated by a commercial company (LITA). Teletype is preferred since it provides a written record. It would be assumed that this flight information would be passed to the appropriate Soviet/DDR air traffic control centers to assist in maintaining separation of flights.

This ties in with Mr. Gaffler's suggestion that it would give an appearance of reasonableness to make public some provision for corridor crossings by Soviet and other aircraft. If we do not do so, he believes, Communist propaganda may depict the Three Powers as making it impossible for Soviet and other flights to cross the corridors without jeopardy. Such provision would require delineation of both specific altitudes and geographic areas where reserved altitudes would be applicable.

It is our view that Bonn's two proposals are not really alternatives but rather that Alternative two complements Alternative one. Alternative one is the course we must follow whether or not we inform Soviet/DDR authorities in advance of flight plans. If they accept and act upon the flight information provided to them by the channels suggested it would be a very useful supplement to our own flight safety procedures but it would be, as usual, subject to Soviet/DDR whim and beyond our control.

You may also wish to note receipt of the agreed tripartite Berlin Airlift Plan and to indicate that it is being studied by the U.S.

7. Berlin Contingency Planning - Surface Access

Tripartite agreement has been reached in Bonn on recommended instructions to Allied travellers by road and rail routes to and from Berlin in the event of Soviet takeover of checkpoints to our personnel. We have revised this paper based upon Bonn's telegram and copies have been distributed to the British and French.

You may wish to point out to the British and French the problem raised in Geneva's 19670 158 concerning the necessity to minimize the possibility of women and children being caught in the Soviet zone. Two methods are suggested. 1. Halt such travel upon receipt of substantial evidence that the Soviets are on the verge of turning checkpoints over to the East Germans. 2. Require in such situations that all private vehicles travel as part of military convoys.

While the first suggestion may be feasible the second does not appear to be useful since it would add an unnecessary encumbrance to

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to military convoys which present instructions comprehend allowing to remain where caught indefinitely. Moreover, if women and children or civilian vehicles generally were included in military convoys we could no longer properly describe them as military convoys.

IXL. To be Raised in Interdepartmental Meeting Only

8. Serious Use of Force Plans -- LIVE OAK

You may wish to ask Defense for a report of progress on plans for serious use of force to maintain surface access to Berlin.

9. Air Contingency Planning

You may wish to obtain Defense views on alternatives one and two (see item 6 above) before discussing with the British and French.

In addition you may wish to ascertain whether Defense has any report of progress on planning for measures to be taken in the event of serious interference with our air access to Berlin (reference: paragraph 12, item b.4, Berlin Contingency Planning Paper, April 4, 1959).

10. High Altitude Flights in Berlin Corridors

JCS has stated its views on high altitude flights in the Berlin corridors. It is pointed out that we have said the recent flights were necessary because of the characteristics of the aircraft and were not intended to be provocative. Refraining from making further flights is regarded by many as tantamount to admitting flights were provocative. JCS wants to make regular, frequently scheduled high altitude flights without regard to VFR conditions. They consider this particularly urgent to give air crews experience should an airlift using C-124's and C-130's become necessary. Defense may raise this problem (TOSSEC 129 - Tab C).

11. Surface Probes to Test Soviet Intentions -- LIVE OAK

You may wish to seek clarification of details of Courses of Action "B" and "C" from Defense.

In addition, since both courses of action call for the operation of tripartite military convoys we believe we should start now to establish precedents for such convoys of mixed nationality (a few dry runs would also be useful practice) and for the movement of armored personnel carriers over the Autobahn, both alone and in convoys. Defense has already passed this suggestion to General Horstad for his consideration. His reaction has not yet been received.

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PROPOSAL FOR THE COORDINATING GROUP ON BERLIN CONFIDENTIALITY PLANNING

1. General Horstel's comments and recommendations on the military organization of the Tripartite forces and on the nature of the initial probe in the Berlin crisis are contained in EC 9-10710 (NA IN 213713). His recommendations appear to be in consonance with previous agreements except that Course of Action "A" is not likely to establish Soviet intent to use force or permit the use of force to bar Allied access to Berlin.

2. It is therefore proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be authorized to inform General Horstel of the following United States views and agreements:

a. The United States agrees to the following:

(1) Designation of General Horstel as the overall Commander for Tripartite Operations.

(2) Placing CINELAC under the direct command of General Horstel for Tripartite Operations.

(3) Placing Tripartite forces in Berlin under the operational control of CINELAC for Tripartite Operations.

(4) Designation of a single commander in Berlin for the conduct of Tripartite Operations. (The UK Commander would be a logical selection.)

(5) CINELAC to deal directly with CINCEUR and COMUSMACV for matters concerning administration and logistics support of national forces.

(6) Courses of Action "B" and "C" are militarily acceptable. Determination of the course of action to be taken will be made by the Tripartite Forces in light of the political and military situation at the time.

b. While Course of Action "A" might be employed to indicate clearly the Soviet intent to obstruct Tripartite surface travel to Berlin, it is not likely to elicit Soviet reaction that will indicate their intent to use force. In all probability the "force" which the East German checkpoint personnel would use in such circumstances would amount only to a refusal to raise the barrier at the checkpoint. Course "A" would thus only confirm what had already been ascertained before the probe was made, namely that Allied traffic could not pass without complying with some formality which the Allies had decided to be unacceptable. The object of the probe is to ascertain, after such a situation already exists, whether the Soviets would use or permit the use of force (going beyond the usual refusal to raise the barrier and other normal traffic control measures) to prevent the passage of an Allied movement which refuses to comply with the unacceptable formality.

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c. The United States will inform the United Kingdom and France of the above views.

d. The United States understands that the United Kingdom and France may make direct replies to General Norstad's proposals of 13 May.

e. Use of NATO communications facilities and exercise of command function from SHAPE would require prior consent of MAC which could not be requested without informing MAC at least in general terms of Tripartite organization. This might lead to requests by other NATO members to participate in planning if NATO communications facilities to be used. U.S. has requested General Norstad's views in this regard; the final U.S. position on this point will be forwarded upon receipt of General Norstad's views.

f. As soon as possible the views of the Tripartite Staff are desired as to military action to be taken in event of failure of the probe, i.e., views as to the nature and magnitude of military measures necessary for restoring freedom of passage (Cf pars. 1-b (2), 11, and 13-c of the Tripartite "Berlin Contingency Planning" paper dated April 4, 1959).

3. It is further proposed that the Department of State:

a. Inform the United Kingdom and France of the views contained in 2-a and b above.

b. Urge the United Kingdom and France to furnish their approval or comments to General Norstad without delay.

c. Seek clear agreement that General Norstad shall serve as the commander of the Tripartite Operations.

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TAB B

Berlin Contingency Planning

Draft Agreed to By:

Mr. Radius
Mr. Stratton
Mr. Charpy

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For Submission to Ambassadors

Reference: Tripartite Paper, dated April 4, 1959, Paragraph 12b 1)

The Task

Task 1 is defined in the tripartite paper of April 4, as follows:-

12 b "The three Embassies at Bonn in consultation with the tripartite staff in Paris or with other military headquarters as appropriate should review or complete contingency planning to deal with the following aspects of the Berlin air access questions:

- (1) Possible Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center"

General Considerations

- (a) Under presently agreed policy if the Soviet Controller withdraws from the BASC an East German Controller could not be admitted in his place.
- (b) The above will continue to apply unless an acceptable agency relationship has come into operation on the lines of paragraph 6 of the paper of April 4 (see "Possibility III" below).
- (c) If an East German Controller had been excluded and the "Western" desk in the BASC was left empty it would be desirable to keep the BASC in being on a tripartite basis in order to emphasize that the Western Allies still regard the system of air corridors as in force.
- (d) Allied airlines are more likely to agree to go on flying if some means exist whereby the East Zone air traffic control authorities can be informed in advance of Allied flights in the corridors.

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- (e) IAF Germany would also prefer that some system of notification were in force. It is assumed that the U.S. and French Air Forces take the same position, but this consideration is not decisive in the case of military aircraft.
- (f) At present the Russian authorities probably secure separation of their flights from Allied flights by generally confining their flights to altitudes above 10,000 ft. or below 2,500 ft.

Possible courses of action open to the Allies

- I To refuse to accept an East German Controller in the BASC and to refuse to permit any Western communications with the East German authorities on air control matters relating to Berlin air access.

This action would eliminate BASC as a coordinating body but the effect of its lapse on air safety in the corridors is uncertain. Under the existing arrangement, the Soviet Controller in BASC is notified of Western flights through the corridors, although Soviet approval for the flights is not requested. Routine flight plans passed to the Soviet Controller are initialed by him and returned. His initial is regarded by Western Controllers as acknowledgement of the notification and not as approval, even though the Soviets apparently view the set of initialling flight plans as a "guarantee of flight safety". The Soviet Controller has sometimes refused to initial unusual flight plans (over 10,000 ft) and refused to "guarantee" the safety of these flights. At other times, he accompanies his initial with a written comment imposing a limitation not acceptable to the Western Controller concerned, e.g. altitude limitation on "1,000 on top" flights, accompanied by a refusal to "guarantee flight safety" beyond the limitation. Flight plan details are telephoned by the Soviet Controller to Soviet military headquarters at Berlinhurst, and thence, it is assumed, to Soviet and Gdr air traffic control centers in the vicinity of the Berlin corridors and control zones.

The effect of the above procedure concerning flight plans is presumably to enable the Soviets to ensure separation of their own and Gdr aircraft from those of the Three Powers. It is believed that Soviet sensitivity to Western flights above 10,000 or below 2,500 feet in the corridors may be due in part to their reservation of the airspace above and below these altitudes for their own use. If this is so, filed Western flight plans are important to them in separating their aircraft during ascents and descents through the corridors from and to airfields lying

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below the corridors or in the control zone. Changes in Western flight plans while aircraft are enroute are seldom passed by the Soviet Controller to Karlshorst, reinforcing the belief that the Soviets rely mainly on blanket altitude limitations for separation. Once Western aircraft have been picked up by Soviet radar, with the aid of the filed flight plans, they are doubtless tracked for lateral straying but there is little Soviet interest in altitude changes unless the limitations they try to impose are exceeded.

With the Soviets out of MAB, this presumed safety control would be lost, since the Soviets and the GDR would no longer be on notice of Western corridor flights. Nevertheless, Tempelhof ATC could continue to provide some safety control, at least to Western aircraft, through its radar facilities and direct contact with aircraft in flight. However altitude estimates for unidentified aircraft are of necessity poor and positive control impossible if there is no communication between a Control Center and unidentified aircraft. Therefore flight separation by the Western Powers alone, without regard for Soviet control activities, presents serious problems. However, in the absence of threats and harassment, and particularly if improved radar facilities are installed at Tempelhof ATC and Gumpert, it would be possible to give some measure of protection.

If this possibility is adopted the Three Powers would rely on the statement proposed in paragraph 2(6) of the April 4 paper that they "expect their traffic to move freely to and from Berlin and will assume the Soviets have given blanket assurance of safety of all Three Power aircraft in the Berlin corridors and the Berlin control zone".

- II To refuse to accept an East German Controller but attempt to notify the East German authorities of Western flights so that the East German authorities can effectively provide flight separation.

Two communication links between East and West Berlin which might be of use are:

- (i) The telephone from the MAB which at present is connected to Russian military headquarters at Karlshorst,
- (ii) The telephone line and teletype line from Tempelhof to the Deutsche Lufttransport (East) booking office at Strasseburger Platz in East Berlin. The latter is operated by a commercial company (SITA).

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

If it were decided to notify the East Berlin authorities of Allied flights in advance it would be better to do it by teletype so that the flight plans were received in writing. This might be done by requisitioning the SITA line connecting it through to Tempelhof ATC and the BASC which would remain in being on a tripartite basis. Under this possibility the Three Powers would make a unilateral announcement that they assume the Soviets, by their action, have given blanket assurance of safety to all Three Powers aircraft in the Berlin corridor and Control Area and that to enable the Soviets to fulfill their responsibilities, flight plans will be notified to the DL [EAST] office at Straesburger Platz by teletype or telephone, and it is assumed that this information will be passed to the appropriate air traffic control authorities. This announcement should be included in the notice to the Soviet Government and the public statement referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the paper of April 4.

If the East German authorities should ask to improve this arrangement any further the Allies should not enter into direct talks with them but might consider substituting a West German on East Berlin authority to conduct technical discussion on their behalf.

111. To accept an East German Controller in the BASC as a Soviet "agent".

This arrangement could only be made in circumstances envisaged in paragraph 4 of the paper of April 4. In this case the East German controller would be accepted into the "Eastern" desk as the agent of the Soviet Union. The Three Powers would have to make it clear that they were not asking him for permission to fly but simply informing of filled flight plans so that he could arrange for East German and Soviet aircraft to keep clear. The Allies would regard his presence in the center as an indication that the East German authorities accepted the principle that the Three Powers have the right to unrestricted air access to Berlin.

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should also insure that begins now

It is very desirable to notify the Soviet authorities of Allied flights in advance it would be better to do it by teletype so that the flight plans were recorded in writing. This might be done by reestablishing the BIRA line and connecting it through to Torgue ATC and the HASE which would result in being on a separate basis. Under this possibility the Three Powers would make a unilateral announcement that they assured the Soviets, by their action, have given blanket assurance of safety to all Three Power aircraft in the North corridor and control was such that to enable the Soviets to fulfill their responsibilities, flight plans will be notified to the (West) office at Washington, either by teletype or telephone, and it is assumed that this information will be passed to the appropriate air traffic control authorities. This announcement should be included in the notice to the Soviet Government and the public statement referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the paper of April 4. *End of line*

II. If the East German authorities should ask to discuss this arrangement further the Allies should not enter into direct talks with them but might consider designating a West German or East Berlin authority to conduct technical discussions on their behalf.

III. To accept an East German Controller in the HASE as a Soviet "agent".

This arrangement could only be made in the circumstances envisaged in paragraph 6 of the paper of April 4. In any case the East German Controller would be accepted into the "Eastern" block as the agent of the Soviet Union. The HASE would have to take it clear that they were not asking him for permission to fly but simply informing him of Allied flight plans so that he could arrange for East German and Soviet aircraft to keep clear. The Allies would regard his presence in the Center as an indication that the East German authorities accepted the principle that the Three Powers have the right to unrestricted air access to Berlin.

Recommendations

Group agreed that discussion with UK and France would point out existence of question and state that there may be additional solutions; US still has rather inflexible stance

3. President desires counter-balance should be studied but low level working groups without committing nations.

4. We will report Diplomatic measures - effort so far in arriving at good understanding of Western position rather than on seeking support

Results so far appear to be indifference to specifics of Geneva solutions, but concern that peaceful solution of Berlin problem be sought. May be possible to solicit representatives

5. UN Report on current activities by the spokesman

4. Status of draft public statement